SCM对我国技术创新投入政策的影响

政府的技术创新投入属于一种补贴,必须受到世界贸易组织《补贴和反补贴措施协议》(A-greement on Subsides and CountervailingMeasures)(以下简称SCM)的约束和规制。我国的技术创新投入应是不可诉的补贴,是完全合法的补贴,是受到SCM保护的。因此,正确识别不同种类补贴的标准,是制定符合SCM的财政投入政策的前提。     

双寡头竞争下的反倾销与补贴政策比较

与现有相关研究只注重Cournot模型不同,文章在Bertrand模型中,就反倾销税和生产补贴对进口国产量、进口量、消费量及社会福利等方面影响进行比较,试图理解进口国政府使用反倾销为代表的进口保护手段的动因。分析表明,在进口产品和本国产品差别不大的情况下,如果进口产品对本国产品具有明显的成本（即价格）优势,进口国政府从本国社会福利出发,会倾向使用反倾销税为代表的进口保护政策。根据结论,针对中国遭遇反倾销的现实,提出了调整出口目标和理念、调整和优化出口产品结构、调整中国出口产品的竞争策略等对策措施。     

Political competition,tax salience and accountability. Theory and evidence from Italy

This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability, especially when elected officers can choose among a number of tax instruments. We develop a political agency model showing that politicians in more competitive jurisdictions use less salient tax instruments more intensely. Defining salience as visibility or, analogously, as voters' awareness of the costs associated with specific government revenue sources, we argue that voters are less likely to hold politicians to account for the associated tax burden of a less salient instrument. This in turn implies that strategic politicians will more heavily rely on less salient revenue sources when electoral competition is stronger. Using data on Italian municipal elections and taxes over a 10-year period, we determine the degree of salience of various tax instruments, including property taxes (high salience) and government fees for official documents (low salience). We then show that mayors facing stronger competition for re-election use less salient tax instruments more intensely.     

Fiscal decentralization and government size: The role of democracy

This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes, proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument using panel data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–2013. We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with government size and that a higher level of democracy tends to mitigate the negative impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by offering a novel insight on mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size in the literature.     

政策不确定性对公司投融资行为的影响研究

本文以2003-2013年中国A股上市公司的财务数据和31个省市自治区地方官员的变动数据为样本,采用地方官员变动率作为地方政策不确定性的代理变量,研究了政策不确定性对企业投融资的影响。研究发现,政策不确定性显著降低企业的债权融资,但是对股权融资影响不显著。政策不确定性对企业投资的影响存在两种渠道,一是通过降低企业融资来影响投资,二是通过企业资本运作降低融资对投资的影响系数,即政策不确定性越高,企业债权和股权融资对投资的正向作用会越小,这种作用机制在国有企业、大企业等与政策联系紧密的企业中作用更为显著。融资可获得性是政策不确定性影响投资的重要前提之一,融资可获得性较小时,政策不确定性显著降低了企业投资;在融资可获得性较大时,政策不确定性影响不显著。加强长期制度建设,降低政策不确定性,对于稳增长具有重要意义。     

Exploring the relationship between government and destination competitiveness: The TALC model perspective

Competitiveness is evident in the marketplace as tourism has become a major tool for economic grow and job creation. Destinations must learn how to think more like businesses and develop new products, markets, and customers. Governments also play vital roles in tourism development, ranging from minimal to high level of involvement. Due to tourism's dynamic nature, Butler's (1980) tourism area lifecycle (TALC) framework helps explain the level of government involvement in tourism development. This article develops a conceptual model adding government involvement and destination competitiveness to TALC. Secondary data demonstrate the model and the results extend TALC's conceptualization by adding national competitiveness and government involvement to explain destination development.     

土地价格、土地财政与宏观经济波动

本文在一个包含金融加速器的新凯恩斯动态一般均衡模型中引入土地财政和政府隐性担保融资机制,借此考察在土地财政体制下土地价格的波动特征、驱动因素和对宏观经济的影响机制,同时使用2004Q1到2016Q1的中国宏观经济数据对模型进行贝叶斯估计。方差分解的结果表明,在样本期间,土地需求冲击、土地供给冲击和货币政策冲击是驱动中国土地价格变动的主要因素,货币政策冲击和土地供给冲击是引起短期土地价格波动的主要因素,土地需求冲击在长期中驱动了土地价格波动。数值模拟结果发现,土地财政对宏观经济波动具有放大效应,正向的土地需求冲击将推高土地价格,并通过抵押约束机制引起宏观经济波动,地方政府对土地财政的依赖将放大该效应,并进一步对土地价格形成正向反馈,从而引起宏观经济更大的波动;在土地财政体制下,正向的土地供给冲击有助于抑制土地价格上涨,并减少宏观经济波动。     

基于状态空间模型的政产学研资协同创新四螺旋影响因素实证研究

在三螺旋理论框架下，搭建政府、产业、大学、研究机构和资本部门四螺旋模型，运用文献归纳法选取多元主体协同创新6类影响因素，以主体间协同程度测度结果为因变量基础，利用状态空间模型动态分析这些因素影响方向、大小和趋势。实证结果表明，中国经济因素表现为促进作用持续提升；中国技术市场规模和创新产业规模表现为先抑制后促进，且促进作用不断提升；中国产品市场需求和创新投入表现为抑制作用持续提升；中国创新产出在时间上表现为促进作用先提升后下降并最终稳定的状态。最后，提出不同政策建议，以促进中国政产学研资协同创新体系后续发展。     

Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.     

农业机械化发展及其服务外包的原因分析——源自冀豫鲁3省问卷调查数据的证明

[目的]在统计描述华北平原农民的机械采纳率和机械采纳方式的基础上,分析农民的机械化需求和农机手的机械服务供给行为及其内在逻辑,从理论和实证两个维度对华北平原地区农业机械技术的特殊实现形式——服务外包做出解释。[方法]运用描述性统计分析和成本收益核算等方法,利用冀豫鲁3省779个农户和45个农机手的实地调研数据分别对农业机械化发展的前提条件和实现方式做出解释。[结果]农业劳动力成本上升与农机购置成本下降,共同刺激了农民的机械技术需求,是华北平原农业机械化快速发展的前提条件;持有农业机械的农民基于理性选择而向其他农民提供农机作业服务,是推动华北平原农业机械化以服务形式实现的主要原因。[结论]相关部门应继续探索高效的农机补贴模式,刺激农民的机械技术需求;农业机械支持政策可适当向农机合作社倾斜,提高农机手的组织化程度和服务数量与质量。